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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ANNOTATIONS
This section contains a digest of all reported decisions interpreting pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code published from the second week
in July 1965 through the last week in September 1965 in the National
Reporter System.
STEVEN H. GRINDLE
GERALD F. PETRUCCELLI, JR.
ARTICLE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation
by Agreement
BENEDICT V. LEBOWITZ
346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-402, infra.
SECTION 1-105. Territorial Application of the Act; Parties'
Power to Choose Applicable Law
ASSOCIATES DISCOUNT CORP. V. CARY
262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Civ. Ct. 1965)
Annotated under Section 9-504, infra.
SECTION 1-201. General Definitions
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964) 	 [ Section 1-201 ( 25) ]
Annotated under Section 3-104, infra.
IN THE MATTER OF UNITED THRIFT STORES, INC.
242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965)
	 [ Section 1-201 (37) ]
Annotated under Section 9-102, infra.
BENEDICT V. LEBOWITZ
346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965)	 [ Section 1-201 (39) ]
Annotated under Section 9-402, infra.
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-105. Definitions: Transferability; "Goods"; "Future"
Goods; "Lot"; "Commercial Unit"
WICKHARI V. LEVINE
261 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-106, infra.
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SECTION 2-106. Definitions: "Contract"; "Agreement"; "Contract
for Sale"; "Sale"; "Present Sale"; "Conforming"
to Contract; "Termination"; "Cancellation"
WICKHAM V. LEVINE
261 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
Defendant is the proprietor of several take-out food shops which sell
cooked meat and shrimp pieces solely for off-premises consumption. The
standard of measurement had been a uniform piece count per order. Pur-
suant to two sections of the New York Agriculture and Markets Law, the
Commissioner of Agriculture sued to enjoin sales made on any basis other
than net weight, except where the pieces would be part of a complete dinner.
The court granted the injunction as to the meat items, but found that
the statute exempted certain seafood products including shrimp. The court
further ordered that an accurate scale be maintained on the premises and
made readily available to the customers.
In interpreting the statute and reaching its decision, it was necessary
for the court to find that the defendant had sold the goods at retail and, in
so doing, the court used Sections 2-105(I), -106(1), -314(1) and -401(2).
G.F.P.
SECTION 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise,
Description, Sample
SPRING VALLEY COUNTRY CLUB, INC. V. MADDEN SUPPLY CO.
208 N.E.2d 230 (Mass. 1965)
Plaintiff brought suit against the United States Rubber Company (USR)
on counts in negligence and breach of warranty, alleging that USR was the
producer of certain material used by another defendant in the manufacture
of certain pipes which plaintiff had purchased. USR's demurrer on both
counts was sustained.
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the ground that both counts
failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim against USR. As to the
breach of warranty, the court, citing Section 2-313 of the Code, further
noted that the complaint showed affirmatively that there was no privity be-
tween the parties.
COMMENT
Section 2-318 states the specific exceptions to the rule that privity
is needed for a breach of warranty action. Beyond these exceptions, Com-
ment 2 to Section 2-318 and Comment 3 to Section 2-313 specify the Code's
neutral stand as to the necessity of privity and leave this matter to the devel-
oping case law of the particular jurisdiction. It would seem from this case
that Massachusetts has chosen not to abandon its pre-Code requirement of
privity, a step which other jurisdictions have not been afraid to take and
which is supported by many legal authors. See, e.g., Prosser, Assault Upon
the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
S.H.G.
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SEELY V. WHITE MOTOR CO.
403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965)
To be casenoted in VoI. VII No. 3.
SECTION 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade
WICKHAM V. LEVINE
261 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-106, supra.
SECTION 2418. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Expressed or Implied
SPRING VALLEY COUNTRY CLUB, INC. V. MADDEN SUPPLY CO,
208 N.E.2d 230 (Mass. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-313, supra.
SECTION 2-401. Passing of Title; Reservation for Security;
Limited Application of This Section
NEWHALL V. SECOND CHURCH & SOC'Y
209 N.E.2d 296 (Mass. 1965)
Defendant church is the successor of a Trinitarian Congregational
Church which, early in the eighteenth century, had been the recipient of five
silver vessels. Two of these vessels were inscribed with language indicating the
donor's intent to limit their use to sacramental services and the other three,
while bearing no such inscription, were clearly suitable for sacramental use.
Presently, the defendant is affiliated with the Unitarian-Universalist Associa-
tion and has consequently discontinued its sacramental rituals. Having no
present use for the vessels, the defendant entered into a contract by telephone
to sell them to a museum. Payment was subsequently made by check. A letter
from the buyer indicated thdt the contract called for physical delivery of the
silver to his representative in Boston. Before delivery, plaintiff, a proprietor
and thus a member of the corporate church, sought to permanently enjoin de-
fendant from performing the contract.
The superior court dissolved a temporary restraining order issued by
the lower court and ordered delivery of the vessels. It stayed all proceedings,
however, and reported the case to the Supreme Judicial Court.
Inasmuch as all the necessary parties were not involved in this particular
litigation, the supreme court expressly refrained from deciding whether legal
title was in the deacons or in the church. Rather, it confined itself to the
"question whether there is such a restriction as to limit the disposition of the
property by the legal title holder." The court then reversed the delivery
order and ordered an injunction restraining the sale of the two inscribed pieces,
holding that the inscriptions were express commitments which effectively lim-
ited their use and disposition. As to the other three vessels, however, the court
held that since there was no such express restrictions they could be sold.
For the purpose of granting injunctive relief, the court determined that
title had not yet passed to the buyer. In so doing it went to Section 2 -401 (2)
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of the Code and concluded that title would not pass until the seller completed
physical delivery of the goods.
G.F.P.
WICKHAM V. LEVINE
261 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-106, supra.
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-104. Form of Negotiable Instruments; "Draft";
"Check"; "Certificate of Deposit"; "Note"
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-104, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 90 (1964).
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in finding that the plaintiff
was a "holder in due course" under Section 3-302, had stated that "the stand-
ard of notice contemplated under ... § 3-302(1) (c) is actual notice and not
merely reasonable grounds for belief." 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 367, 372, 196
N.E.2d 847, 851-52. Subsequent to the report of this case, the court modified
its opinion, 347 Mass. 119, 125 (1964), adopting the view that "notice" as
used in Section 3-302 does not mean "actual knowledge." Under Section
1-201(25), "a person has 'notice' . . when . . . from all the facts and
circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know
that it exists." The court, however, did not reverse its finding that the
plaintiff was a "holder in due course" because "there was nothing in this
evidence by which the plaintiff had 'reason to know' of any fraud." Compare,
Annotation, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 90, 92 comment 3 (1964).
SECTION 3-106. Sum Certain
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-104, supra.
SECTION 3-118. Ambiguous Terms and Rules of Construction
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-104, supra.
SECTION 3-302. Holder in Due Course
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-104, supra.
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